University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 4

Number 2

Article 13

1979

Sex Discrimination: State Veteran's Preference Statute Declared
Unconsitutional under Discriminatory Purpose Rule
Richard A. Ciambrone
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr

Recommended Citation
Ciambrone, Richard A. (1979) "Sex Discrimination: State Veteran's Preference Statute Declared
Unconsitutional under Discriminatory Purpose Rule," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 4: No. 2, Article
13.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/13

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information, please
contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

SEX DISCRIMINATION: STATE VETERAN'S PREFERENCE STATUTE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE

RULE-Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978),
pro. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3245.
INTRODUCTION

Military veterans have traditionally been granted special advantages in securing governmental employment.' The underlying rationale
for such benefits is to promote the governmental interest in rewarding
those who have served their country in the military, 2 to aid in the
rehabilitation and relocation of veterans whose life style has been disrupted by the military service, 3 and to provide incentives for young
men and women to join the armed forces." This form of legislation'
has been the subject of many constitutional challenges on due process
and equal protection grounds. 6 Due to proscriptions limiting the
number of women eligible to enter the military,' veterans' preference
statutes have generally been inaccessible to most women. Accordingly,
an increasing number of judicial challenges have been made by women
alleging that preference legislation violates the equal protection clause.
The statutes have generally been upheld as a rational means of implementing a state's goal of aiding the veteran.' Nevertheless, in Feeney v.
1. See Note, Veterans' Preference In Public Employment: The History, Constitutionality, and Effect On Federal Personnel Practices of Veterans' Preference
Legislation, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (1976).
2. H.R. Rep. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1944).
3. Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Minn. 1972).
4. Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 486-87, 281 N.E.2d 53,
57 (1972).
5. Such legislation is in two forms. The first form grants veterans an absolute
preference without requiring that they compete in a civil service examination. The second gives the veterans "preferences", i.e., bonus points, only after they have passed a
civil service examination. The first type of preference has been declared unconstitutional. See McNamara v. Director of Civil Serv., 330 Mass. 22, 25-26, 110 N.E.2d 840,
843 (1953); Note, Veterans' Preferences in Public Employment, supra note I at 631
n.69.
6. U.S. CONST. amends. v, xiv.
7. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, §3209(b), 70(a) Stat. 174, repealed by Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, § (9)(E), 81 Stat. 375; Act of Aug. 10,
1956 Pub. L. No. 84-1028, §5410-11, 70(a) Stat. 298 repealed by Act of Nov. 8,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, § 1 (16), 81 Stat. 376; and Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L.
No. 84-1028, §8215, 70(a) Stat. 298, repealed by Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-130, § 1 (26)(E), 81 Stat. 382. The Army still maintains a two percent limitation
by regulation. 32 C.F.R. § 580.4(b) (1977).
8. See Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), upholding
Minnesota's preference statute giving an absolute preference to veterans when they
seek initial appointment to a civil service job. See also Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F.
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Massachusetts,9 a three-judge federal district court upheld a challenge

to the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute due to its unfair impact on women, causing them to be precluded from that state's higher

administrative positions.
The focus of this note is on the rationale applied by the district

court, on remand, in reaffirming its earlier decision to declare the
veteran's benefit statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's holding in Washington v. Davis0 will be discussed and applied to the

district court's decision on remand. The district court's finding that
the statute disproportionately impacted on women was alone insufficient to support its invalidation of the statute. Under the principles of
Davis, the district court was required to objectively analyze whether or
not the statute served an invidiously discriminatory purpose," an
analysis inadequately made by the Feeney court.
FACTS AND DECISION

This case was brought as two separate actions by four Massachusetts women, challenging that state's veterans' preference statute.12
In the first suit, the claims of three of the women, who were seeking
positions as attorneys, were declared moot upon passage of an act
removing all appointments for state and municipal legal positions from
the civil service law.' 3 Plaintiff Feeney's claim concerning an adminisSupp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973), which sustained Pennsylvania's preference legislation
awarding a ten point bonus to any veteran who received a passing grade on the
state's civil service examination. The court held that once the classification is found
to rationally relate to a legitimate end, it will not be set aside. The stricter equal protection review was not warranted, according to the court, because the classification
was found neither to be suspect nor to affect a fundamental interest. For an overview of equal protection analysis, see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
9. 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3245
(1978).
10. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
11. See notes 17-18 infra and accompanying text.
12.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West 1966). The statute reads in perti-

nent part:
The names of persons who pass examinations for appointment to any position
classified under the civil service shall be placed upon the eligible lists in the
following order:
(1) Disabled veterans as defined in section twenty-three A, in order of their
respective standing; (2) veterans in the order of their respective standing; (3) persons described in section twenty-three B [widows or widowed mothers of
veterans] in order of their respective standing; (4) other applicants in the order
of their respective standing.
The present version of this statute is at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, §5 (West
Supp. 1979).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 5 (West 1966). The present version of this
statute is at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 5 (West Supp. 1979).
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trative post in the civil service was retained under the name Anthony v.
Massachusetts.'
In 1971, Ms. Feeney received the second highest test score for the
position of Assistant Secretary to the Board of Dental Examiners.
Nevertheless she was relegated to the sixth position on the list, due to
the policy of granting an absolute preference on the eligibility list to
veterans who had passed the exam. Two years later, she applied for
another administrative post, receiving the third highest test score. This
time her ranking was lowered to number fourteen behind twelve male
veterans, eleven of whom had lower test scores. Finally, for a third
time, Ms. Feeney sought an administrative position and received a
score which would have placed her within the top twenty candidates on
the eligibility test. Again, her rank was lowered, this time to seventieth,
behind fifty male veterans with lower test scores."
Ms. Feeney obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
defendants"6 from filling the position for which she was applying pending the outcome of the case and then sought a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the statute and a declaration by the court that
the veterans' preference statute was unconstitutional. A three-judge
panel of the Massachusetts federal district court issued the injunction
and declared the statute unconstitutional.1 7 On direct appeal' 8 to the
United States Supreme Court, the case was remanded' 9 under the name
0 for reconsideration in light of the Court's
Feeney v. Massachusetts"
recent decision in Washington v. Davis.'
Before examining the Feeney holding, it is helpful to consider the
Court's decision in Davis concerning the required elements of an equal
protection analysis. Davis involved the validity of a qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police officers in the Washington, D.C. Police Department. The complainants alleged that the written test was racially discriminatory because its results excluded a disproportionate percentage of black applicants. 22 The Supreme Court
14. 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976).
15. 451 F. Supp. at 149.
16. See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 487 n.2 (D. Mass. 1976). The
court dismissed the actions against the commonwealth of Massachusetts and the
Division of Civil Service stating that they were not "persons" as required by section
1983.
17. 451 F. Supp. at 144.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
19. 434 U.S. 884 (1977). It should be noted that the Davis decision dealt with
disproportionate impact on race while Feeney deals with gender-based discrimination.
20. 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978),prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1978).
21.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

22. Id. at 232-37.
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held that the facts of the case did not warrant invalidation of the test
procedure based solely upon its disproportionate impact. 2 3 Application
of the principles of equal protection was held to require a tracing back
of the invidious quality of a law to a racially discriminatory purpose. 24
Such a purpose does not have to appear on the face of the statute, but
can be discerned from the totality of the facts demonstrating the disproportionate impact. The Court looked to objective factors in
deciding whether a discriminatory purpose could be attributed to the
legislature. 5 Perhaps the most important objective factor was whether
the act served a legitimate purpose which the defendants are not constitutionally prohibited from promoting. 6 Impact may not be the
"sole touchstone" of a determination of discrimination; there must
also be a finding of a racially discriminatory purpose to the allegedly
unlawful statute or state act. 27
On remand, the Massachusetts district court, in Feeney, held that
the Davis holding supported its earlier decision.2 8 The court stated that
the primary legislative purpose of the statute-to reward public service
in the military-was praiseworthy, but the means chosen by the state
to achieve its objective were not founded on a "convincing factual
rationale." 2 9 Relying on its earlier language in Anthony, the court held
that the impact of the selection formula involved was controlled by
23. Prior to Davis, there was considerable uncertainty regarding whether the
principal test of discrimination was purpose or effect. Although prior cases suggested
that discriminatory effect and not purpose was the chief determinant, no prior
Supreme Court case was actually based on that principle. Perry, The Disproportate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PENN. L. REV. 540 (1977).
24. 426 U.S. at 240. "Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its
face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion
of one race than of another." Id. at 242.
25. 426 U.S. at 241-42.
26. Schwemm, From Washington To Arlington Heights and Beyond:
DiscriminatoryPurpose In Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961 (1977).

(1977).
27. 426 U.S. at 242. The court stated further that the impact claim standing
alone does not trigger the rule that classifications must be strictly scrutinized. The
majority was not disposed to adopt the Title VII standard (of the Civil Rights Act of
1964) for reviewing acts which disqualify a substantially disproportionate number of
blacks. According to the court, under the Title VII approach discriminatory purpose
need not be shown, and it is an insufficient defense to state that some rational basis
existed for the challenged practices. This stricter review does not apply for purposes
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 238-39.
28. The majority of the district court felt that both Davis and the Supreme
court's later opinion in Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) supported their conclusion that the preference statute was unconstitutional.
29. 451 F. Supp. 143, 145.
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previous federal military proscriptions, which limited to two percent
the number of women who could participate in the armed forces.3" The
act clearly benefited male veterans at the expense of women, 3 1 and the
legislature was charged with the knowledge of previous restrictions on
women entering the military.3 2
The court distinguished Davis on the basis of the nature of the
selection procedure challenged in both cases. The written examination
in Davis was found to be neutral on its face; the Massachusetts statute,
however, was "anything but an impartial, neutral policy of selection,"
because of "the formula's impact, triggered by decades of restrictive
federal enlistment regulations . . .,,"
The district court, interpreting the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Davis, examined the Massachusetts preference statute and policies and
determined that it had the foreseeable effect of producing a
discriminatory impact.3" Using the statistical evidence demonstrating a
pattern of exclusion from the civil service, the court ascertained a
discriminatory intent on the part of the legislature.3" The formula was
thus determined to be "a deliberate, conscious attempt on the part of
the state to aid one clearly identifiable group . . . those who qualify as
veterans, . . . at the absolute and permanent disadvantage of . . .
women." 3 6 Finally, the court found that the state had other less drastic
alternatives available to it for aiding veterans.
ANALYSIS

The Feeney opinion reflects the difficulties confronting state and
federal courts in attempting to discern and apply the discriminatory
purpose test laid down in Davis. The Feeney court attributed a
discriminatory intent .to the Massachusetts legislature on three
grounds: (1) the foreseeability of disproportionate impact, (2) the
statistical evidence of negative impact, and (3) the availability of less
30. Id.
31. Id. at 146.
32. 451 F. Supp. 143. The court also assumed the legislature knew that the
criteria in the military regulations bore no relations to fitness for civilian public service. This conclusion was an additional factor in determining discriminatory intent.

Id. at 148.
33. 451 F. Supp. at 146 (quoting Anthony, 415 F. Supp. 485, 495).
34. This examination was mandated by the language in Davis stating that an invidious discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the facts. 426
U.S. at 242.
35. At the time of the suit, only two percent of Massachusetts women were
veterans. A large percentage of women civil service appointees filled lower grade
positions and the preference statute was found to virtually exclude women from advancing their position. 451 F. Supp. at 149.
36. 451 F. Supp. at 146 (quoting Anthony, 415 F. Supp. at 495).
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drastic alternatives. Although all such inquiries are pertinent to traditional equal protection analysis, the foreseeability and statistical

evidence tests are not sufficient indicia of the discriminatory intent
required by Davis. According to one leading commentator, the less
drastic alternative analysis is only controlling when a court uses strict
scrutiny in evaluating an equal protection challenge, i.e., the statute
involves a suspect class or violates a fundamental right. 7
Since the Davis decision, equal protection challenges to veterans'
preference statutes have been rejected in California,3 8 Illinois,3 9 and
New Jersey.4 1 In each case the court rejected a showing of disproportionate impact as the sole basis on which to judge invidiousness of a
facially neutral statute. Unlike the Massachusetts statute, the statutes
involved in these states did not grant veterans absolute preference on
eligibility lists once they had passed the exam.4 1 Arguably, these decisions can be distinguished from Feeney, based upon the enhanced impact of the absolute preference in Feeney. Nevertheless, the holding of
Davis and subsequent cases interpreting that decision is that a showing
of disproportionate impact is insufficient to invalidate a statute neutral
on its face. It must also be shown to have been promulgated with

discriminatory intent.
37. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). But see Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally, 1976 Wis. L.
REV. 330, 333-41 (1976).
38. Bannerman v. Dep't of Youth Auth., 436 F. Supp. 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
In California, pursuant to CAL. Gov. CODE § 18973 (West Supp. 1979), a veteran, widow
or widower of a veteran is allowed a credit of ten points to his or her passing score on
an entrance examination for a civil service position. Relying on Davis, the court held
that legislative intent was the crucial factor in discrimination cases. No intent to
discriminate against women was attributed to the California legislature, and the
statute was upheld.
39. Branch v. DuBois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976). The Illinois
preference statute provided for an addition of seven-tenths of one point, or fraction
thereof, for each six months served, not to exceed thirty months of credit. Plaintiff's
disproportionate impact challenge was rejected because the court found the extent of
discrimination to be unclear. The use of preference points in Illinois arguably
hinders but does not preclude the advancement of women in the civil service, and
for that reason, was distinguished from Anthony. Id. at 1132.
40. Ballou v. State Dep't. of Civil Serv., 148 N.J. Super. 112, 372 A.2d 333
(App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Here the
plaintiff's equal protection challenge was undercut by a finding of the New Jersey
Civil Service Commission that there was insufficient evidence to prove that women
were discriminated against by the preference statute to any greater degree than were
other non-veterans. The equal protection argument was also rejected because the
statute was neutral on its face and satisfied the Davis mandate of lack of
discriminatory intent. See N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 11:27-4 (West 1976).
41. In every veterans' preference scheme, a passing grade must be attained
before the veteran is eligible to receive any of the various forms of preference. See
note 5 supra.
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A. Foreseeabilityof DisproportionateImpact
The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.4 2 reaffirmed the Davis decision and established
certain criteria to guide a judicial inquiry into legislative purpose."3
Arlington set out four basic criteria by which an investigation into
legislative purpose may be guided. These factors are as follows: (1) the
disproportionate impact of the act, (2) the historical background of the
legislative decision, (3) the sequence of events leading up to the
challenged action, including departures from the norm, and (4) the
legislative or administrative record of the decision. 4 ' The Feeney court
erroneously considered only the first and fourth of these criteria. If it
had considered the remaining two, it would have found that the statute
was passed against a background of a post-war period and that many
other states, as well as the federal government, had passed similar
statutes.
The Feeney court imputed discriminatory intent to the
Massachusetts legislature. "The legislature was, at the least, chargeable
with knowledge of the long-standing federal regulations limiting
opportun.eis - -;,ounten in the military, and the inevitable
discriminatory consequences produced 4 by the challenged formula
because of these limited opportunities.""
The Feeney court strays here from the purpose test stated in Davis
and refined in Arlington." Neither the purpose test of Davis nor the
guidelines enumerated in Arlington includes the concept of
foreseeability. On the contrary, the analysis prescribed by these cases is
mostly retrospective and not prospective in determining whether there
is a discriminatory purpose. In Arthur v. Nyquist,4 ' a New York
District Court felt that both Davis and Arlington precluded a
foreseeable consequence analysis in determining whether disproportionate impact is determinative of discriminatory intent.
It is misleading to suggest, as does the court in Feeney, that simply
because the Massachusetts legislature may have or should have been
aware that this statute would disproportionately affect women, they
acted with a purpose to discriminate. Since Massachusetts cannot be
charged with purposefully setting the federal military limitations upon
women in the armed forces, argument is much weaker that the
42.
43.
44.
45.

429 U.S. 252 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 267-68.
451 F. Supp. at 148.

46. See note 21 supra.
47.

429 F. Supp. 206 (W.D. N.Y. 1977).
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disproportionate effect of this statute was the product of a
discriminatory intent. It can be argued that a legislature which has a
discriminatory intent could carry it out by taking advantage of a situation created by another level of government. Nevertheless, the military
limitations on women have been altered over the years"8 and could even
be abolished. They are not a constant disability on which the state
legislatures can depend, but are rather a variable factor independent of
the passage of a state statute benefiting veterans.
In addition, there are several legitimate state goals which are served
by preference legislation. 9 The legislative history of the statute states
that the purpose of the law was to give preference to qualified veterans
for consideration in civil service employment. 5" The intent is to aid
veterans who were unable to gain civilian work experience or seniority
during the period of military service.
The discrimination in the present case is analogous to Geduldig v.
A iello," where the legislative distinction was held to be between types
of disabilities, and not between males and females. In that case
California's disability insurance system, the Unemployment Compensation Disability-Fund was challenged. Under that system benefits were
paid to persons in private employment who were temporarily unable to
work because of a disability not covered by workmen's compensation.
The definition of disability, however, did not include pregnancy. Thus
neither workmen's compensation nor the disability insurance program
paid benefits to persons temporarily unable to work because of
pregnancy. The Supreme Court found that there were no risks from
which men are protected and women are not. 2 Similarly, in Feeney,
there are no advantages given to male veterans which are not given to
female veterans. The legislative classification is drawn along the nongender distinction between veterans and non-veterans.
B. Statistical Evidence of DisproportionateImpact
The statistical evidence relied upon by the Feeney court is also relevant to the impact argument. Foreseeability concerns the prospective
view of impact, statistical evidence the retrospective view. Statistical
evidence was used in Feeney to create an inference of discriminatory
purpose.
48.
49.

See note 6 supra.
See notes 2-4 supra, and accompanying text.

50.
51.

451 F. Supp. at 154. (Murray, J., dissenting).
417 U.S. 484 (1974).

52. " "Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the
other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation such as this on a reasonable basis
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Davis held that disproportionate impact is relevant in ascertaining
a discriminatory intent and that a statute cannot be administered in a
manner tantamount to deliberate discrimination. Statistical patterns
from a sampling of administrative decisions can lead to an inference,
without proof of motive, that an improper criterion had been used. 53
Absent a statistical pattern approaching the extremes of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,5" however, impact evidence is not enough and the court must
look to other evidence. 55 In Yick Wo, of a total of 320 laundries subject to the Board of Supervisors control, 310 were in wooden
buildings, of which 240 were owned by Chinese citizens. A licensing
statute required operators of laundries located in wooden buildings to
obtain the consent of the Board of Supervisors before continuing
operation. Chinese laundry owners were denied licenses, but nonChinese, with one exception, were granted permission to continue
operations.
Since the district court failed to fully consider other evidence of
discriminatory intent, the connection between the statistical inference
of discrimination and invidious motive seems tenuous. The impact is
indeed greater on women than on men but the statute has not been applied in such an uneven manner as to establish that the legislature
sought to exclude women from higher administrative civil service
posts. The pattern of administration must be so discriminatory as to be
unexplainable on other grounds.5" The pattern in Feeney can be explained on grounds other than sex discrimination, as the state had
legitimate goals it wished to implement in order to aid veterans who
experienced a disadvantage for the period of their service which was
not experienced by non-veterans. Non-veterans were able to gain
civilian job experience and seniority while veterans served in the armed
forces.
C. Presence of Less DrasticAlternatives
While the preceding discussions of foreseeability and statistics are
related to an impact argument, less drastic alternative analysis deals
more with the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. Equal protection review requires a determination of the appropriate standard to be
used in gauging the constitutionality of the statute.5 7 Traditional
analysis looks to the reasonableness of the classification in light of its
purpose." The class must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
53.
54.

See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).

55.
56.
57.

429 U.S. at 266.
Id.
Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252, 256 (M.D. Pa. 1973).

58.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
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end and will only be set aside if based on reasons totally unrelated to
that goal. 59
A stricter equal protection analysis is applied in instances where a
classification is based upon a suspect criterion or involves a fundamental right.6" Classifications in these instances will be upheld only if the
state can show compelling interests necessitating the classification usanalysis is applicable under this strict
ed." Less drastic alternatives
62

scrutiny judicial review.

The right to be considered for public employment has not been

viewed as a fundamental right.6 3 Furthermore, classifications based on
6
gender have not been declared suspect by the Supreme Court. " The
Feeney court reasoned that because less drastic alternatives were
5
available to effectuate the legislature's desire to aid veterans, the

preference statute was invalid. Since the class of veterans defined in
Feeney is not suspect, however, and the right to public employment
which is sought to be protected is not a fundamental right, the court
inappropriately considered less drastic alternatives, a tool of strict
scrutiny analysis.
CONCLUSION

Disproportionate impact, absent additional evidence of discriminatory intent, is not sufficient to invalidate a facially neutral
59. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
60. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
61. Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and
Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C. R.-C. L. 725, 726 (1977).
62. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1972).
63. Ms. Feeney was contending that the statute precluded her from being considered for a civil service appointment. Given the nature of the selection process, it
cannot be maintained that she would definitely have received the appointment in the
absence of this statute. See Feinerman, 356 F. Supp. at 257. Some examples of fundamental interests are: (1) the right to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
(2) the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and (3)
rights of a uniquely private nature, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) in which a four-judge
plurality declared women a suspect class. Examples of suspect classes are: race,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and alienage, Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971). The tendancy in modern judicial decisions involving gender has
been to use the Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), test of a "fair and substantial"
relationship between the classification and the end sought to be achieved by the
state. Recent cases by the Supreme Court have found sex discrimination in instances
of dissimilar treatment of men and women who are similarly situated. See Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
65. 451 F. Supp. at 150. For the specific alternatives suggested by the district
court, see Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/13
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statute. The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute involved in this
case is neutral on its face, as it is neither drawn along gender lines,
"nor does it provide for dissimilar treatment for similarly situated men
and women." 66 Once an act is shown to be neutral on its face, the
Supreme Court's holding in Davis dictates that proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to establish an equal protection violation. The Feeney court attributed an invidious purpose to
the Massachusetts legislature, based primarily on its finding of
disproportionate impact. The reasons upon which the court reliedthat disproportionate impact was foreseeable, that statistical evidence
created an inference of a discriminatory purpose, and that less drastic
alternatives were available-do not prove that the Massachusetts
legislature was influenced by sexually discriminatory motives in promulgating its veterans' preference statute.
A rule that a statute designed to serve legitimate ends is invalid
because its burdens fall disproportionately on one sex and this
disproportionate impact is foreseeable is far-reaching and could serve
to invalidate many tax, public service, and welfare statutes, which
place a higher burden on one group than another. 7 Nevertheless, the
court in Feeney applied such a rule to find the Massachusetts veterans'
preference statute invalid.
Richard A. Ciambrone
66.
67.

451 F. Supp. at 152. (Murray, J., dissenting).
Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
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